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Abstract 
Managing the quality of a product and a company within a production network is a challenging task for decision makers, as the impact of 
actions is often time-delayed and can lead to the famous bullwhip effect in a multi stage supply chain. In order to qualify decision makers to 
understand the fundamental principles of quality management in production networks and thus enable them to effectively use it to optimize 
quality within his or her company, a game based simulation similar to Goldratt’s game, called Q-I-Game, has been developed and tested in a 
previous research project. Within the game, one player acts as a factory between a supplier and a customer and states his desired invest into 
quality, the quantity of parts to be ordered and the investment into an inspection of incoming parts. The game uses simple, artificial functions to 
model effects between the investment into quality and the resulting quality of produced parts. To improve the learning effect of the game in 
regards to inspection planning as well as to promote understanding of the mechanics, the functionality of the game was expanded and a more 
realistic model of production is being developed and shown in this paper. The added functionality allows to simulate an extended supply chain 
with multiple players all acting as customer and supplier within the game. Thus, the game has evolved from simple single player to a complex 
multi-player game, taking the fact into consideration, that the bullwhip effect increases downstream of the supply chain. In addition, players 
will have the opportunity to make decisions on defect parts coming from a supplier (e.g. reject them and accept a new supply date). The 
extensions of the game which are already realised will be presented within the paper and future developments will be discussed. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Peer-review under responsibility of the Scientific Committee of 48th CIRP Conference on MANUFACTURING SYSTEMS - CIRP CMS 
2015. 
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1. Introduction 
Production companies in high-wage countries today are 
challenged by the ever increasing competition of markets. 
Upcoming companies from low-wage countries are not only 
challenging established companies by offering substitute 
products at aggressive prices. Furthermore, the technological 
know-how of companies from low-wage countries is 
increasing rapidly. Thus established companies are required to 
justify higher product prices through an exceptionally high 
product quality and at the same time reduce the costs related 
to their products by reducing their own sourcing and 
production costs and making their processes more efficient. 
[2] 
Assuring the right quality for both supplied parts and the 
finished product, is a challenging task in this regard, 
especially due to the increase of global sourcing to save 
costs.[3]. Not surprisingly, quality management is generally 
regarded to be closely connected to both supply chain 
coordination and supply chain management [4]. A competent 
quality manager has to be able to control the quality 
throughout the entire production network, in order to assure 
that the output of his own company meets customer 
specifications and to keep all costs related to insufficient 
quality at a minimum. To do so, tools and methods from 
various disciplines such as simulation based forecasting from 
supply chain management [5] and Weibull- and risk-analysis 
from quality management and inspection planning [6] have to 
be put to effective use. In this sense, decision makers in 
supply chain management have to be familiar with the various 
tools provided for supply chain management. However they 
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should have a profound understanding of the causes and 
effects of their decisions within the production network [7, 8]. 
2. Game-based learning approach 
The approach of game-based learning using so called 
“serious games” can be used to educate quality managers 
about the consequences of their decisions in production 
networks. Besides its use of training managers and thus 
supporting them in their decision making processes, game-
based learning also generates valuable information and data 
which can provide a better understanding of human behaviour 
in complex and stressful situations. This is especially 
important as similar information usually remains hidden in 
real world scenarios and thus cannot be used to reflect 
decisions [9, 10].  
The first approach which can be seen as a predecessor of 
today’s business games is dated back to 1932, when Mary 
Birshstein developed a simulation to support management 
decisions in a production plant of typewriters. The American 
Management Association developed in 1956 the first 
commonly known business game called Top Management 
Decision Simulation. To support supply chain managers in 
their decisions, simulations such as the Beer Distribution 
Game [11] have been developed. The Beer Game simulates 
the relation between stocks and order quantities among 
different players in a supply chain. The aim of the game is to 
visualize the so called bullwhip effect, which has later been 
proven to be existent by Lee [12]. The bullwhip effect 
describes the phenomenon that a simple increase of the 
customers product demand leads to an amplification and 
oscillation in other stages of the supply chain (see Fig. 1).[1, 
13] 
Another game-based learning approach is Goldratt’s Game. 
Similar to the Beer Game, players step into different roles 
within the supply chain or a production process. This turn-
based game shows how simple variances in each process step 
can amplify and thus influence the whole process quality. 
Empirical studies have shown that game-based learning 
approaches are more effective than traditional learning by 
studying [14].[15–17]  
3. Educational game for quality management in supply 
chains 
To provide decision makers in supply chain management a 
better understanding of the principles and interdependencies 
of quality and costs within a production network, a simulation 
based game (Quality-Intelligence-Game, or Q-I-Game) has 
been developed in a cooperation of the Chair for Metrology 
and Quality Management and the Human Computer 
Interaction Center at the RWTH Aachen University. The 
game is designed as a one player game, who acts as a 
manufacturer in a three stage production system consisting of 
a supplier, manufacturer and customer. The other two 
functions are realized through simulation models. Within a 
Java based graphical surface, the player makes certain 
decisions which then count for a one month production 
period, aiming at maximizing profit at the end of a given 
game period (e.g. after 2 years or 24 periods). The player is 
able to decide on the investment into quality inspections for 
incoming goods. A higher investment leading to a lower 
number of faulty parts entering his manufacturing system. 
Every detected faulty part directly leads to a penalty for the 
supplier, whereas the model behaviour is changed depending 
on the amount of penalties the supplier has to pay for faulty 
parts. Furthermore, the player is able to invest into the quality 
of manufacturing processes, higher investment leading to 
lower variances of the fault rates, lower fault rates in general 
and thus, lower penalties for customer complaints of faulty 
products. The player has to decide on the amount of procured 
parts from the supplier for the next round, whereas high 
stocks lead to warehouse costs and inability to deliver 
products and this to profit loss. [17] 
4. Motivation for further development of the game 
This section focusses on the current game structure, 
identified constraints and possible improvements of the model 
behind the game. Following the discussion of these 
constraints, necessary extensions to the game will be 
presented.  
4.1. Constraints of the current development state  
Within the current development state, three major 
constraints are present which affect the realism of the game’s 
behaviour, as well as the complexity of strategies which can 
be used to play the game. 
 
Constraints regarding the quality of procurement 
Within the current state of the game, the single possibility of 
the player to influence the quality of delivered parts is through 
the value of investment into incoming inspections, which 
influences the detection rate of defect goods following a 
simple linear function. This presents a constraint to the 
strategic options available to control the quality of delivered 
goods from a supplier. 
 
Constraints regarding the quality of manufacturing 
In terms of product quality the player is able to decide on the 
investments into the manufacturing process quality which 
directly influences the rate of defect-free manufactured 
products, when using defect-free input parts. The connection 
between investments and rejection rate follows a simple linear 
function. However whether a linear function is really able to 
reflect the reality of quality investments in manufacturing 
Fig. 1. Visualisation of the bullwhip effect in a supply chain[1] 
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companies is unknown. Holweg and Bicheno indicate that 
realism in supply chain simulation games is an essential factor 
for the credibility of the game [18]. Another constraint in 
regard to the quality of manufacturing in the game is the fact, 
that product quality is modeled as a simple ratio of good and 
faulty products at the end of the manufacturing process. The 
ratio of good to defect parts depends on the investment into 
the production quality via the linear function. The fact that the 
current game only models a product to be good or faulty also 
does not enable the player to strategically work towards 
optimizing his own process reliability, following the theory of 
Taguchi´s loss function. [19] 
 
Constraints regarding the possible game modes 
The Q-I-Games supply chain allows one player to play the 
game as a manufacturer, in the middle position of a simple 
three stage supply chain. This presents a significant 
educational constraint of the game as players cannot 
experience, how the bullwhip effect amplifies along a multi 
(more than three) stage supply chain from the customer to the 
supplier [12]. For this reason, the initial Beer-game consisted 
of four stages and during its evaluation, the same 
amplification of order variance accounted to the bullwhip 
effect has been observed [11].  
The mentioned limits served as motivation to develop a new 
game for quality management in supply chains which will be 
discussed in the following subsequent sections. 
4.2. Necessary extensions of the game 
The current constraints offer several new developmental 
directions for the game. The possibilities how to address these 
constraints through extensions of the game are presented 
consequently. 
 
4.2.1. Extensions to control the quality of procurement 
Quality penalties and rewards 
Besides the investment into the inspection policy, 
manufacturers can in reality use penalties and rewards to 
motivate suppliers to deliver higher quality and thus reduce 
the cost of low-quality for the manufacturer itself [20]. A 
necessary extension would therefore be to give players the 
possibility to define penalties and rewards for his/her supplier. 
Penalties could also include the possibility to reject entire 
deliveries if the ratio of faulty parts is above a specific limit. 
Giving players the opportunity to experience how the 
interplay between inspection rate (i.e. invest into inspection), 
penalties and rewards can be used to control the quality of 
supplied parts, should be beneficial to the educational value of 
the game. Especially in contract negotiations with suppliers, 
managers could use this knowledge to motivate the supplier to 
deliver the desired quality. 
 
Supplier selection 
Supplier selection is a major task within quality 
management and is critical to the success of production 
networks [16]. A more realistic approach of the supplier 
interaction should include the possibility of the selection 
between different suppliers or even the choice of multiple 
suppliers at the same time [21]. Hence, the long-term 
influences of different sourcing and supplier strategies (low 
price vs. high quality) could be analysed.  
 
Connection between supplier quality invest and cost of his 
products 
Because of the described possibility for the player to reject 
an entire delivery from the supplier, depending on a certain 
ratio of faulty parts, the supplier must be able to improve his 
product quality due to higher investments. To be more 
realistic and to hold the player from just always demanding 
deliveries without any faulty parts, the model should include a 
connection between these higher investments and the price of 
the supplier’s product. In the end a lower acceptance ratio for 
faulty parts results in higher procurement costs for the 
manufacturer. 
4.2.2. Extensions to control the quality of manufacturing 
 
Manufacturing model uses real-world parameters 
A model function, based on a real production scenario 
could benefit the game through enhanced realism in terms of 
game behaviour. In real production scenarios, quality 
problems occur which may require more difficile strategies 
towards procurement and inventory optimization than using 
the simple model of the current development state. 
 
Modeling product quality individually and continuously 
 Realisation of a specific degree for the quality, instead of 
products being categorised into defect and defect-free. Of 
course, depending on the customer requirements, this 
categorization still has to be made afterwards in order to 
decide, whether the produced quality is sufficient or not. The 
second improvement then would be the implementation of a 
realistic function, describing the connection between 
investments and production quality better than the current 
assumed linear connection (as described in section 4.1). 
4.2.3. Extensions to the game modes 
 
Horizontal extension of the production network 
Allowing a more complex production network, consisting 
of more than one factory, i.e. an arbitrary number of 
consequent factories could benefit the game by enabling 
players to experience different amplifications of the bullwhip 
Fig. 2. Concept of the Q-I-game 
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effect and develop individual strategies to counter this effect 
at their respective position.  
 
Multi-player gaming 
Enabling multiple players to act as factories within a multi-
stage supply chain would enable comparison of the players at 
different stages within the supply chain. In addition, different 
communication strategies could be explored, to determine 
what the minimum amount of information is which has to be 
passed on from player to player, in order to keep the 
production network stable and prevent the bullwhip effect 
from occurring.  
 
Multiple suppliers and customers per factory 
Enabling multiple vertical connections from and to each 
factory would bring aspects of supplier selection and 
competition into the game´s strategic focus. This vertical 
extension in combination with the other extensions could lead 
to complex game situations with competing manufacturers 
with different strategies and multiple customers with different 
requirements regarding the product quality.  
 
Intelligent computer players 
Following an extension of the game towards multiplayer 
gaming, it could also be beneficial to create an artificial 
intelligence (AI) for the factories, which could be used to 
artificially increase the size of the production network and 
thus enable more complex game scenarios without the need 
for more human players. These AI players could also be used 
to examine different pre-defined strategies in terms of their 
effectiveness for different game situations and modes. 
Realizing such an AI is the most challenging of the presented 
possible extensions, as specific algorithms would have to be 
developed to fit the game mechanics. 
4.3. Summary 
Whether the extensions which were presented can bring an 
actual benefit to the educational value of the game and to the 
understanding of human behavior in complex supply chains 
remains to be examined. The extensions which were derived 
from the current constraints of the game were taken as 
motivation to develop a new game as a re-development of the 
Q-I-Game which will be presented consequently. 
 
5. LogisticsSim – A new educational quality game 
To differentiate the new game from the Q-I-Game, it is titled 
“LogisticsSim” and is currently under development at the 
Chair for Metrology and Quality Management of the RWTH 
Aachen University. It is also being developed in Java. The 
new game realizes the player factories as instances from a 
generic factory class. An arbitrary number of instances can be 
generated for a certain game with every instance being played 
by a different human player. Thus, the game becomes a 
multiplayer endeavor with variable complexity of the supply 
chain. The game can be played without communication 
between players to encourage the development of individual 
strategies in order to counter the varying amplitude of the 
bullwhip effect at different positions within the supply chain. 
Bringing multiple players into one game, different level of 
information transfer can be realised, in which e.g. players are 
allowed to share their inspection policies or their invest into 
production quality to a certain degree. This modality enables 
players to experience the extensively analyzed advantages of 
information sharing in supply chains. [12, 22]  
The game thus allows for a far more complex simulation of 
the actual bullwhip effect, as demand and supply control are 
now placed into human hands. Players can still influence the 
detection of faulty parts through investments. However a new 
element is introduced into the game which allows the player to 
reject an entire delivery of parts if the detected ratio of faulty  
 
parts is above a certain pre-defined limit and to once receive a 
new delivery within the same round of the game. In the prior 
version of the game every part which was detected to be faulty 
simply leads to a fixed penalty for the supplier. Following a 
rejection of the entire delivery, the supplier then has to re-
inspect the entire delivery. If the ratio of faulty parts for the 
entire shipment is indeed above the pre-defined limit, the 
supplier has to cover all costs related to the scrapping of faulty 
parts. Otherwise the customer has to cover these costs. After 
sorting out the faulty products the supplier fills up the 
difference in the shipment with products from his stock. If he 
is unable to do so a penalty for the incomplete delivery has to 
be paid by the supplier.  
 
This requires the player to consider various different 
information and aftereffects when deciding about his factories 
inspection policy. For example, if a delivery from the 
manufacturer contains too many faulty parts, as described he 
has the possibility to reject the entire delivery and to receive a 
new one during the same round. If the second delivery also 
contains an unacceptable high number of faulty parts, the 
player is again allowed to reject the delivery in the next 
round. This may result in the situation that the manufacturer is 
unable to produce the number of parts ordered by the 
customer leading to a loss of profit .  
This example should give an impression on how this new 
game element can increase the complexity of the game and 
the different strategies which can be pursued by the player. 
Fig. 3. Multiplayer game realisation with horizontal extension and three 
parallel supply chains 
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6. Conclusions and Outlook 
In this paper the constraints of the Q-I-Game, an 
educational game for supply chain quality managers have been 
presented. These fall into three main categories: Constraints 
regarding the possibilities to modify the inspection policy of 
incoming parts, constraints regarding the possibility to control 
the quality of manufactured products and regarding the 
constraints regarding possible game modes. In order to 
overcome these limitations, a new game called LogisticsSim 
has been presented which presents a development of the Q-I-
Game. The new LogisticsSim game addresses several of the 
constraints of the Q-I-Game in its current development state. 
Especially the possibility to have multiple players participate 
in one instance of the game and the possibility of declining a 
shipment following a bad sample inspection make completely 
new strategies possible. However not every possible extension 
has been realized within the software at the current 
development state and concepts have to be developed to 
realize these extensions. In addition, a new graphical surface 
will have to be developed which enables the user to effectively 
control the new decisions the game allows.   
Possible elements of the LogisticsSim which were derived 
from the constraints of the Q-I-Game now have to be 
implemented step by step and a behavioral analysis has to be 
conducted, whether these new elements are accepted by the 
players and whether they lead to new strategies within the 
game. 
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